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ABSTRACT
Techniques are described herein for preventing Media Access Control (MAC)
address spoofing attacks based on the two-step onboarding process for open Service Set
Identifiers (SSIDs) due to Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) override after the Internet
Protocol (IP) address is learned. These techniques leverage Opportunistic Wireless
Encryption (OWE) and an access token to provide a secure channel between the wireless
network and the client.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Wireless client onboarding and segmentation through open Service Set Identifiers
(SSIDs) require the client to join a base Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) associated
with the SSID, acquire an Internet Protocol (IP) address to proceed with web authentication,
and then change VLANs based on the type of service/policies that need to be applied. The
change of VLAN involves changing subnetworks after the client has already acquired an
IP address on the base VLAN. Current solutions for VLAN override after Web Layer 3
(L3) Authentication are brittle and require disassociating the client while retaining the
client state on the wireless controller for some time while awaiting client rejoin. The Media
Access Control (MAC) address of the client is used to fetch the state of the client without
an additional re-authentication, which potentially allows for MAC address spoofing attacks.
Accordingly, techniques are presented herein which leverage Opportunistic
Wireless Encryption (OWE) to provide a secure channel between the wireless network and
the client. During the authentication procedure, a results page from the portal returns a
secure token as part of a new Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) header. The token is
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supplied during rejoin through the same HTTP header to the portal, which skips the
credential request based on the validation of the token.
Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) version 4 variant 1 as defined in Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments (RFC) 4122 are leveraged for the
token. Furthermore, a new Access_token HTTP header is added. Browsers may be
requested to store and return cookies to improve seamlessness on the client side.
Figure 1 below illustrates a sequence diagram that provides an example onboarding
flow.

Figure 1

This solution prevents MAC address spoofing attacks after client de-authentication
upon VLAN override, providing an additional level of security to the VLAN override
functionality. These techniques also integrate seamlessly into the web authentication
process.
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The solution may be further enhanced by extending OWE to at least perform Access
Point (AP) - side certificate validation. This may be similar to operations currently
performed by the browser based on pre-installed root chains.
If OWE is not required, the solution may still apply by requiring HTTP Secure
(HTTPS) during the web authentication process. The procedure for generating the token
and validating on the portal may remain the same, but the secure channel mechanism may
change.
This solution is also compatible with other Layer 2 (L2) authentication procedures
(e.g., dot1x, Pre-Shared Key (PSK), etc.) because the access token is provided during the
web authentication phase.
In summary, techniques are described herein for preventing MAC address spoofing
attacks based on the two-step onboarding process for open SSIDs due to VLAN override
after the IP address is learned. These techniques leverage OWE and an access token to
provide a secure channel between the wireless network and the client.
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